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In 1992, police departments and social service agencies in the United
States received over 2.9 million reports of child abuse.' Each report had
to be investigated, usually by a police officer or social worker.2 Investi-
gators conclude that, because of a lack of credible evidence or any reason
to believe abuse occurred, at least half of all reports of child abuse are
without merit.3 Often an investigation of reported child abuse includes
a warrantless search of the home of the child's parent or guardian or of
the child's person, raising constitutional concerns.4 The issue of just how
far Fourth Amendment protections extend in searches conducted durng
child abuse mvestigations is one of continued contemporary importance.
5
At stake are not only the personal liberties of families and children, but
also the government's interest m protecting families and children from
both abuse and invasions of privacy.'
' Bonme M. Rubm, Anti-Abuse Message Misses Young Dads, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15,
1994, (Chlcagoland), at 3 (examining the problem of curbing child abuse at the hands of
young fathers).
I See William Glaberson, Family Nightmare: A False Report of Child Abuse, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1990, at B1, B12 ("New York State law reqires that social-service
agencies begin an investigation within 24 hours of an abuse report.").
IId. at B1 (discussing a zealous social worker's investigation of two non-abused
children due to "confusion with another family with a different name in another town").
4 See ina notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
53 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.3(a) (2d ed. Supp. 1995) (discussing Fourth Amendment limitations on
searches of private homes with respect to personnel of child protection agencies).
6 According to the court in Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 894-95 (7th Cir.
1986):
A final resolution of this issue will require the reconciliation of very fundamen-
tal constitutional values: the prvacy rights of the child; the privacy rights of the
family in the important area of childrearing; and the obligation and right of
responsible government to deal effectively with the stark reality of child abuse
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."7 In order to protect these freedoms, the U.S.
Supreme Court requires police officers to obtain a wan-ant before
conducting a search or seizure.' However, the doctrine of qualified
immunity for public officials 9 can diminish the effectiveness of the
protection provided by the warrant requirement for searches conducted
during investigations of child abuse. Qualified immunity allows a police
officer to avoid liability if the court finds that neither constitutional nor
statutory law clearly prohibits the search.'" If this defense is successful,
then liability for any damages caused by the search does not attach."
Recently, the Tenth Circuit, in Franz v. Lytle,'2 reviewed the current
state of the law regarding warrantless searches during child abuse
investigations 3 and the applicability of the qualified immunity defense
in such situations. 4 The court refused to absolve the defendant police
officer from the warrant requirement. In so doing, however, the court
drew a distinction between social workers and police officers for these
types of searches,'" and held that a social worker would be entitled to
qualified immunity.
7
The decision in Franz, thus, underscores the need for clearly
established warrant requirements in child abuse investigations. These rules
need to be not only clear but also uniformly applied. Moreover, although
the Franz court justified drawing the distinction between a police officer
in our society ....
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978). A search performed without
prior approval from a magistrate or judge is considered per se unreasonable, and hence
unconstitutional, unless it fits one of a few established exceptions. Id. at 390 (citing Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
' Public officials are shielded from liability if their discretionary actions do not
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 997 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the absence of a search
warant "can only be overcome by the well-delineated exceptions of consent, exigent
circumstances, and administrative searches" (citations omitted)); see infra notes 118-55
and accompanying text.
n Franz, 997 F.2d at 787-90.
14 Id. at 790-92.
"Id. at 793.
"Id. at 791.
'7 Id. at 790.
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and social worker based on the different motivations behind these two
types of child abuse investigators,18 this Note contends that a distinction
between social workers and police officers is unnecessary and unjustified.
This Note, consequently, reviews the current state of warrant
requirement law in child abuse investigations and analyzes its effective-
ness. Part I describes the doctrine of qualified immunity and its impact
-on the warrant requirement.' Part H analyzes Fourth Amendment issues
raised by searches conducted during child abuse investigations; such
issues include whether these searches implicate the Fourth Amendment
and whether one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
applies.20 Part III analyzes the Franz decision, with a focus on the Tenth
Circuit's application of the warrant requirement, the qualified immunity
defense, and the rationale behind the social worker/police officer
distinction.2' Part IV describes the reasons a clear statement of the law
in this area is essential.' Finally, this Note concludes that a clear
statement of the law regarding warrantless searches in the context of child
abuse investigations need not incorporate any new exceptions or
recognize a distinction between social workers and police officers
L QUALIED IMMUNITY
Before discussing the application of the Fourth Amendment to
searches conducted during child abuse investigations, the importance of
the doctrine of qualified immunity must be understood. In the criminal
context, a court evaluates a search under the Fourth Amendment to
determine whether the search violated the warrant requirement or fell
within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.' If
the court determines that the government official conducted a search
either with a valid warrant or under circumstances which fit one of the
exceptions, then the evidence found during or produced from that search
will be admissible at trial If the court determines that the search violated
the warrant requirement or did not fit one of the recognized exceptions
and was thereby an illegal search, then the court will exclude the
Id.
t See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 42-117 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 118-58 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 159-75 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-117 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Amendment
analysis of a search).
1994-95]
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evidence at both the state and federal level 28 This "exclusionary rule"
serves as a deterrent with the goal of preventing illegal searches and
seizures from recurring.'
Fourth Amendment issues also arise in a civil context. If a person
believes he or she was the subject of an illegal search, then that person
can seek to recover damages from the government and the official(s)
responsile for the search.27 For example, the plaintiffs in Franz were
parents who claimed that a police officer did not have a warrant and did
not act within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement when he
strip-searched their daughter.8 The parents sought damages for the
violation of their federal civil rights and for violation of state laws
regarding "invasion of privacy, trespass and deprivation of liberty."
Thus, like the exclusionary rule, civil liability for Fourth Amendment
violations acts as a form of deterrence, and it also provides a remedy to
those injured by the illegal government action.
The deterrent and remedial effect of this liability, however, is
tempered by the doctrine of qualified immunity8 Government officials
receive qualified immunity so they will be protected from "undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability."3 This safeguard shields government officials from liability in
damages actions if their conduct did not violate clearly established
rights.' "Clearly established" has been defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court as follows:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,
but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfilness must
be apparent?
s
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule applies to
the states as well as the federal government).
2 Id. at 656 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2 Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 828 (D. Ken. 1992), aff'd, 997 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1993); see infra notes 118-55 and accompanying text.
Fram, 791 F. Supp. at 828.
3
1 Qualified immunity only impacts the possible civil consequences of a search
conducted by a government official.
"t Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
32 Id. at 818.
' Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).
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The plaintiff has the burden to show that the official's conduct
violated his or her clearly established rights.3' If the plaintiff can show
that the government's action clearly violated the warrant requirement and
did not fall into one of its exceptions, then the plaintiff can recover. If the
court decides, however, that the government action clearly followed the
warrant requirement or fell within one of its exceptions, then the plaintiff
cannot recover. Moreover, if the plaintiff cannot show that the govern-
ment action at the time of the search clearly violated the Fourth
Amendment, then the government agent is immune from liability,,
regardless of whether or not the court later finds the search illegal. Even
though the burden is on the plaintiff; a court is not limited in its legal
analysis to cases and statutes cited by the plaintiV3' The court is to take
a more active role because the applicability of qualified immunity is a
question of law.'
In warrantless search cases, the problem qualified immunity poses for
the plaintiff is determining whether the search to which he or she was
subjected clearly fell within one of the warrant exceptions. Moreover, any
distinction drawn between governmental officials in different branches of
the government complicates the plaintiff's burden. For example, the Franz
court found no qualified immunity for the police officer, but it explained
that under the same circumstances a social worker could be granted
qualified immunity because social workers do not have the same
knowledge of the law as police officers.37 Furthermore, the court noted
that social workers focus on protection of the child while police officers
look at the possible culpability of the adults involved. ' Thus, if the
defendant had been a social worker rather than a police officer, the court
may have found that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded the
defendant from civil liability.
If the court determines that the defendant government official is
immune from liability, then it can grant summary judgment 3 or sustain
m' Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1022 (1994); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
197 (1984).
3Elder, 114 S. CL at 1023.
3Id.
37 Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 786 (10th Cir. 1993); see infra notes 118-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between police and social workers made by
both the District Court of Kansas and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals).
3 Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
"Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1993) (affinning
summary judgment because entry into home during child abuse investigation did not
violate clearly established law).
1994-951
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a motion to dismiss. As a result, where the law is unclear, the court
can grant a government official qualified immunity," and thereby grant
summary judgment without ever determining whether or not the Fourth
Amendment rights of the plaintiff were truly violated. A clear statement
of the application of the Fourth Amendment to child abuse investigatory
searches, therefore, will prevent police officers and social workers from
escaping liability for harms they cause, strengthen the deterrence effect
of civil liability in these searches, and allow those harmed by illegal
searches an appropriate remedy.
IL FouRTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
A. Is the Fourth Amendment Implicated?
The first step in analyzing the legality of a warrantless investigatory
search in a child abuse case is determining whether it is a "search" that
implicates the Fourth Amendment.42 In his treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, Professor Wayne LaFave takes the position that an
investigatory search of a home or child clearly implicates the Fourth
Amendment.
4 3
At least one court, however, does not share in Professor LaFave's
view and fails to see a clear implication of the Fourth Amendment in the
search of the home during a child abuse investigation.' In Donald M.
v. Matava, the district court said that "this question remains, at best,
undecided,"45 and explained that the U.S. Supreme Court did not find
a constitutional violation when a social worker made a warrantless entry
into the home of a recipient of funds from the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") program.' The Donald M. court's view
appears to be in the minority, but the case illuminates the lack of
certainty regarding whether a warrantless search in a child abuse
investigation implicates the Fourth Amendment.47 Unfortunately, the
40 Doe v.Louisiana,2 F3d 1412,1413,1423 (5thCir. 1993) (noting tat defendants were
enitled to qualified immunity and thus reversing the lower court's denial of defendants' FED.
R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6) motion), cert denied, Doe v. Bennett, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994).
41 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
42 3 LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 241.
43 Id.
44 Donald M. v. Matava, 668 F. Supp. 703, 708-09 (D. Mass. 1987).
41 Id. at 709.
' Id. (discussing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (holding that a social
worker who made a warrantless entry into a house in an attempt to enforce state welfare
laws committed no constitutional violation)).
'4 This lack of clarity can impact recovery by plaintiffs who seek damages for a
[Vol. 83
CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS
Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether an investigatory search clearly
implicates the Fourth Amendment.4
The search of a child, particularly in circumstances where investigators
ask a child to remove his or her clothing, appears to implicate the Fourth
Amendment more decidedly than a non-personal searchk" In Danyl H v.
Coler, the Seventh Circuit stated, "'It does not require a constitutional scholar
to conclude that a nude search of a... child is an invasion of the constitu-
tional rights of some magnitude."' Courts therefore must engage in Fourth
Amendment analysis when determining the validity of any search requiring
a child to disrobeW '
When courts engage in Fourth Amendment analysis of a search, they
focus on reasonableness. Under the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable search
occurs when the investigator can show probable cause that evidence of a
crime exists and can be found in the place to be searched.52 "While the
presence of probable cause permits the issuance of a search warrant by a
neutral magistrate, its absence can only be overcome by... well-delineated
exceptions ... !" Other than a consensual search;' these exceptions
involve exigent circumstances 5 and administrative searches~s
B. Emergency Rule Exception
Of the recognized exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant
requirement,' investigators most often rely on the "emergency
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text
' Professor LaFave supports his position by distinguishing a search during a child
abuse investigation from a search during an AFDC investigation. 3 LAFAVF, upra note
5, at 242.
4' See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. (quoting Doe v. Renfiow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981)).
51 See id.
' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (holding that since no probable cause
existed, the search and seizure were invalid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments).
" Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (upholding the validity of
a warrantless search when consent was obtained prior to search).
" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (recognizing an exception to the
warrant requirement in cases of emergency).
m Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967) (permitting a search
pursuant to a warrant issued on less than probable cause because of'reliance on reasonable
administrative standards).
7 See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (need to preserve evidence);
1994-95]
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rule''s in child abuse investigations. In Mincey v. Arizona, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the right of police to respond to emergency
situations, finding no Fourth Amendment bar against "warraniless entries
or searches when ... a person ... is in need of immediate aid."'
Investigatory child abuse searches fit readily into the emergency rule
exception when a government employee ° reasonably believes a child is
in imminent danger or in need of medical attention.'
Although the application of the emergency rule in child abuse cases
varies, the emergency rule, nevertheless, is a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.' In Wooten v. State, a police officer entered an
apartment without a warrant after receiving a report that a child may have
been seriously injured in a beating. 3 The Florida District Court of
Appeal stated that the Mincey decision permits warrantless searches of a
home in emergency situations, such as where investigators believe abuse
is occurring or has occurred. The Wooten court consequently held that
"the entry by officer Swisher was justified by the 'exigent circumstances'
presented by his prior knowledge of the possible abuse of the child, and
upon observing the child itself the need to protect the child, to determine
its condition, and to immediately secure whatever medical or other
attention might be necessary."
The holding of the Florida court in Wooten, then, appears to agree
with the holding of the Wisconsin court in State v. Boggess; Boggess held
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (hot pursuit);
United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611-12 (D.D.C.), affldwithout op., 479 F.2d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (imminent danger).
"See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 (holding that no automatic "murder scene" exception
to the warrant requirement exists but that an exception in cases of emergency does).
"Id. at 392.
"A government employee can be either a social worker or a police officer. See infra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
', See, e.g., Wooten v. State, 398 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(explaining that the emergency rule applies when prior knowledge of possible abuse and
a need for medical attention exist); State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524-25 (Wis.
1983) (explaining that the emergency rule applies to circumstances where a child is
limping but not in grave danger).
" Boggess, 340 N.W.2d at 521 (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not bar "a
governmental official from making a warrantless intrusion into a home when the official
reasonably believes that a person within is in need of immediate aid or assistance").
Wooten, 398 So. 2d at 965.
Id. at 966. Interestingly, the court also said the police officer acted within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment when he collected samples of blood stains seen on the




that a situation need not "involve only life or death circumstances in order to
constitute an emergency under the emergency rule."'65 In that case, a social
worker and a police officer conducted a warrantless search of a home alter
receiving a report that two children had been beaten and might be in need of
medical attention." The report also indicated that one child was walking
with a limp and that the childrens father had a bad temper.
The Boggess court stated that the social worker was subject to the same
requirements as the police officer because state statutes authorized her to
conduct child abuse investigations, and she was therefore an agent of the
government.' Thus, the court did not distinguish between the police officer
and the social worker, presuming that both had a similar level of knowledge
regarding the Fourth Amendment and the restrictions the Fourth Amendment
places on them.69
In sum, the emergency rule gives police and social workers the ability to
enter a home without a warrant in order to prevent further injury or to
provide medical attention. Requiring a warrant under emergency circumnstanc-
es would involve time a victim of child abuse may not have. Absent an
emergency, the wan-ant requirement requires a police officer or social worker
to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause or to rely on another
exception to the warrant requirement the administrative search.
C. Administrative Searches
The administrative search exception generally still requires a police
officer or social worker to obtain a warrant before conducting a search.7
However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court, allowed
entry with a war-ant obtained with less than the traditional probable cause.71
Camara did not involve a child abuse investigation; rather, it involved a
routine yearly inspection for building code violations 2 The Court stated that
a search of a structure for code violations was permissible on this lower
standard for three reasons: (1) both the judiciary and the public widely accept
61 Boggess, 340 N.W.2d at 525.
Id. at 524-25.
6 Id.
Id. at 521 n.9.
See id. at 522 (discussing the objective test of the emergency rule).
70 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
7 ' Id. at 534-38. 'The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to
search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. ... If a valid
public interest justifies the inirson contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue
a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539.
7 ' Id. at 526.
1994-95]
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this type of search;7 (2) public interest demands abatement of code
violations and these inspections are likely to achieve the best results;74
and (3) the searches were not personal and did not seek evidence of
crime.75 Thus, the Camara Court held that in order to meet the standard
for these types of administrative search warrants, a warrant must be
issued based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards. 7,
This exception, moreover, has been expanded in recent years. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the warrant requirement and
the probable cause standard in regard to searches conducted by school
officials.' In New Jersey v. T.L.O., a principal conducted a search of a
student's purse after the principal caught the student smoking in a
bathroom.78 The search revealed evidence of drugs and drug traffick-
ing.79 The Court held that the search did not violate the student's Fourth
Amendment rights and explained that requiring a warrant would impede
the ability of administrators and teachers to maintain discipline."'
The Court balanced the student's interest in privacy against the
school's need to maintain order and found that the balance tips in favor
of the administrators and teachers."' The Court said, "[T]he legality of
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under
all the circumstances, of the search. ' In determining reasonableness,
the Court required a two-step analysis. First, "one must consider 'whether
the ... action was justified at its inception."'" Second, "one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably
related in scope to the circamstances which justified the interference in
the first place.""' This test, consequently, appears to provide a great
deal of flexibility for government officials seeking to protect a state
interest.
73 Id. at 537.
7 ' Id. Many types of violations would not be observable from the outside of a
stnmture, like faulty wiring. Id.
7 'Id.
76 Id. at 538.
7 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985) (holding that "school
officials need not obtain a warant before searching a student who is under their
authority" if they have reasonable suspicion that the student may have violated the law
and/or school rules).
' Id. at 328.
79Id.
So Id. at 340.
81 Id. at 341.
hId.




Other extensions of the administrative search exception provide
further flexibility. Prior to 1987, in cases involving an administrative
search exception, the U.S. Supreme Court focused primarily on the
character of the investigation that precipitated the search - whether the
search was regulatory or criminal8 However, the Court lessened the
importance of this distinction with its holding in New York v. Burger."
In that case, police officers, pursuant to statutory authority, conducted a
warrantless search of a junkyard and found evidence of stolen proper-
ty.' The statute involved authorized warrantless inspections of vehicle-
dismantling businesses to ensure the businesses were not involved in
illegal activity, specifically auto theft.' The Court upheld the validity
of both the search and the statute,' asserting that a state can constitu-
tionally address "a major social problem both by way of an administrative
scheme and through penal sanctions." The Court recognized that "an
administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws,
even if its regulatory goals are narrower."'
The U.S. Supreme Court also upheld a warrantless search of a
probationer's home based on "reasonable grounds." In Griffin v.
Wisconsin, police searched a probationer's house after receiving informa-
tion that guns may be located there.3 A state statute provided the
authority for the warrantless search.' The Court noted that a warrant
requirement would undermine the probation regime.9 Similarly, the
Court said that requiring probable cause for a search of this type would
"reduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement.""9 The Court
S See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
"482 U.S. 691 (1987).
9
7 Id. at 693-95.
n Id. at 694 n1.
"Id. at 712.
"Id. The New York Court of Appeals had concluded that the administrative scheme
allowing warrantless searches was merely a pretext to warrantless criminal investigations.
Id.
"Id. at 713.
SGriffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871, 878 (1987) (citing Wis. ADMiN. CODE
§§ HSS 328.21(4), (7), 328.16(1) (Dec. 1981)).
3 Id. at 871.
"Id. at 870-71 (examining Wisconsin's State Department of Health and Social
Services Regulation, Wis. ADmIN. CODE §§ HSS 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981), which
allows "any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant as long






held that the special need for this type of search identified by the state
was reasonable, given the need for assurance the probationer would
continue his rehabilitation.'
The administrative search exception, thus, should fit into child abuse
investigations quite readily. Courts appear willing to allow this exception
to the warrant requirement in a child abuse case if a satisfactory
regulatory scheme is in place; however, administrative schemes are rarely
in place, and thus the administrative exception has not been applied often.
Danyl H. v. Coler9" provides an illustration of how courts can apply
this exception when regulatory schemes are in place.
In Danyl H., the petitioners appealed the district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of an Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services ("D.C.F.S.") policy which permitted
caseworkers to physically examine a child for evidence of abuse.' The
petitioners also asked the court to review the trial court's summary
judgment based on the qualified immunity of the D.C.F.S. and its
employees, on the issue of liability for a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion.1' °
The court said the D.C.F.S. policy outlined "hot-line criteria" for
determining whether to investigate a child abuse report."' The Darryl
H. court balanced the "obvious!' intrusion of disrobing the child
against the state's interests in protecting the public, particularly children,
from death or serious injury." The court recognized the urgency of
action in child abuse cases where life and limb may be in danger;,'0
however, the court also recognized that over sixty percent of child abuse
9 Id. at 875.
"801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
99 Id. at 894.
'D0 Id.
101 Id. at 895. The D.C.F.S. requires that the following infonnation be received before
proceeding-
(1) a child less than eighteen years old is involved; (2) the child was either
harmed or in danger of harm; (3) a specific incident of abuse is identified; (4)
a parent, caretaker, sibling or [babysitter] is the alleged perpetrator of neglect;
or (5) a parent, caretaker, adult family member, adult individual residing in the
child's home, parent's paramour, sibling or babysitter is the alleged perpetrator
of abuse.
Id. at 895 (citing Memorandum from Gregory L. Coler, Director of D.C.F.S., to
Administrative and Service Staff 10-11 (1983)).
10m Id. at 901.




reports in Illinois are unfounded."5 The court determined that D.C.F.S.
investigators do not violate the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
solely because they fail to obtain a warrant or have probable cause before
conducting a search of a child in an abuse case."°s According to the
court, the administrative scheme outlined in the D.C.F.S. policy suffi-
ciently removed discretion from the social workers."7 Yet, the court
was unable to conclude that the administrative scheme itself was
sufficient to ensure a reasonable search."' Recognizing the uncertainty
in the state of the law, the court decided that the D.C.F.S. was entitled to
qualified immunity and the injunction did not have to be granted."°
The Danyl H. case, consequently, did little to clarify the applicability
of the warrant requirement or the administrative exception to searches
during child abuse investigations."' However, another court has permit-
ted a warrantless search of a child during an abuse investigation
conducted by a police officer."' In Wildberger v. State, a police officer
searched a girl's body without a warrant after finding scratches and other
marks on her brother."2 The court said that the statutory scheme,
requiring child abuse investigators to determine the condition of any other
child in the household when a case of abuse is suspected, satisfied the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness."'
It is unclear, however, why the court in Wildberger concluded no
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, while the court in Danyl H. did
not reach the same conclusion. In both cases, agencies suspected child
abuse, a statutory scheme designed to remove discretion from the
investigator was in place, the investigator proceeded in accordance with
the statutory scheme, and the investigator conducted a visual search of the
15 Id.
,06 Id. at 904.
'
07 Id. at 903.
'0' Id. at 904. "'The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that
the search entails."' Id. at 902 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 599 (1979)).
10 Id. at 908.
U See, e.g., Landstrom v. Illinois Dept of Children & Family Servs, 699 F. Supp. 1270,
1274 (N.D. IML 1988) (stating that the Dawyl-L court was unable to find a rule that all nude
inspections of children were violative of constitutional rights), aftd, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.
1990); Donald M. v. Matava, 668 F. Supp. 703, 709-12 (D. Mass. 1987) (concluding that a
substantial questionremains as to whether warantless home visits by social workers violate the
constitution).
"'. Wildberger v. State, 536 A.2d 718, 723 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
1 Id. at 721.
11 Id. at 723.
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child's body."' Ultimately, the sufficiency of the statutory schemes in
each case may have been the determining factor, however, it should be
noted that Wildberger involved a police officer and Danyl H. involved
a social worker. Yet, the rationale in the Franz decision suggests that
making any distinction between police officers and social workers should
lead to opposite results in the aforementioned decisions." 5
In conclusion, the exigent circumstances and administrative search
exceptions to the warrant requirement offer some flexibility for child
abuse investigations. State statutory schemes designed to permit warrant-
less searches of children and their homes may give rise to an administra-
tive exception. However, the differing results in Danyl H. and Wild-
berger point to the existing uncertainty in the state of law regarding the
warrant requirement in child abuse investigations. In addition to this
uncertainty, before 1993, confusion also existed over whether warrantless
searches in child abuse investigations even implicated the Fourth
Amendment."" This confusion in the state of the law laid the ground-
work for Franz v. Lytle."7
HIL FANz v. LYTLE: THE POLICE
OFFICER/SOCIAL WORKER DISTINCTION
Franz v. Lytle was an appeal from a district court decision which
denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment.118 In a
lawsuit by parents who claimed violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights during a child abuse investigation, the. district court denied the
defendant police officer's affirmative defense of qualified immunity."9
The defendant police officer, Officer Lytle, argued that any administrative
exception for social workers in child abuse investigations should also
apply to police officers.'
114 See supra notes 98-109, 111-13 and accompanying text.
". The Franz court held that a social worker would more readily fit into the
administrative exception than a police officer because the police officer's primary concern
was a criminal investigation while the social worker's primary concern was protecting the
child. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 790-92 (10th Cir. 1993); see infra notes 140-45 and
accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
117 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993).
.. Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 834 (D. Kan. 1992), afid, 997 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1993).
119 Id. at 832; see also supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
no Franz, 997 F.2d at 786.
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The city police department dispatched Officer Lytle "to investigate
a report of a child who was possibly in need of care." Officer Lytle
went to the house of the child's neighbor where the child was play-
ing.' The neighbor told Officer Lytle that the child smelled like urine
and was suffering from a bad diaper rash.' Without contacting the
child's mother, Officer Lytle asked the neighbor to remove the child's
diaper. The officer then observed the child's vaginal area and took five
or six pictures of what he described as a rash. He later told the child's
parents that they would be contacted by Social and Rehabilitative
Services ("S.R.S."), which evidenced his suspicion of child abuse. Officer
Lytle also told his superior officer he was investigating a possible
molestation.'
The next day, Officer Lytle and a female officer, both armed,
returned to the house and conducted another visual inspection of the
child's vaginal area with the consent of Mrs. Franz, the child's mother.
Officer Lytle pressed specific places in the vaginal area, checking the
child's reaction to determine soreness." At the conclusion of the
inspection, he asked Mrs. Franz to voluntarily take the child to a local
hospital so that a doctor might examine her; he told her that if she did
not, then S.R.S. would come and take the girl. 6 The doctor at the
hospital concluded that no abuse had occurredY The parents then
brought a civil action seeking damages resulting from the violation of
their constitutional rights."
In denying Officer Lytle's motion for summary judgment, the district
court inquired into whether the law regarding visual inspections of
children clearly permitted or prohibited this particular search at the time
the defendant acted.' The district court ruled that the Fourth Amend-
ment unequivocally prohibited Officer Lytle's actions because the search
did not fit into one of the recognized exceptions and a reasonable officer
in his position would have known the searches were illegal." The
Id. at 785.
" Id. The neighbor had called in the report. Id. The neighbor called Social and
Rehabilitative Services, but she was told to call the police because no caseworker was




1 6 Id. at 785-86.
27 IM at 786.
"Id. at 784.
Id. at 786 (citing Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1992)).
,,0 Id. (citing Franz, 791 F. Supp. at 831-32).
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court stated that a trained police officer is "expected to know the
subtleties of the probable cause and warrant requirements"' and added
that social workers do not have this fluency."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the
motion for summary judgment. The court recognized that this type
of search implicates the Fourth Amendment."3 However, the appellate
court focused its inquiry somewhat differently than the district court:
[W]e must then decide to sustain a-claim of the lawful exercise of
authority based on qualified immunity if, upon examining the informa-
tion defendant possessed, we can conclude a reasonable officer in the
same position in 1988, schooled in the governing principles of the
Fourth Amendment, believed he was acting in accord with those
principles.
3 5
This inquiry required analysis of the specific requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in these circumstances.
Officer Lytle argued that no clearly established law existed in regard
to visual inspections of children in abuse investigations."3 The court
said that Officer Lytle's reliance on the Danyl H. v. Coler decision was
unfounded. 7 The court in Danyl H. did not go as far as to determine
whether the administrative exception extended to cover child abuse
investigations," but the Franz court said Officer Lytle's conduct would
not fit such an exception if it existed. 39
According to the court, administrative search exceptions require a
balancing of "the individual's privacy expectations against the Govern-
ment's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant
or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."' 4
Officer Lytle argued that his primary focus was the safety of the
31 Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D. Kan. 1992), af'd, 997 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1993).
1n Id.
1 Franz, 997 F.2d at 793.
'4 Id. at 786.
13' Id. at 787.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 788 (discussing Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also
smpra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
' See Daryl H., 801 F.2d at 903.
9 See Franz, 997 F.2d at 793.




child,' 4' but the court found that his actions were not entitled to the
same analysis as those of a social worker.42 The court said the statuto-
ry scheme outlined in the Danyl H. case incorporated the state's interests
in protecting children and did not focus on a criminal investigation.141
In this case, Officer Lytle wore a police uniform and carried a gun during
the searches, recorded his conversation with the girl's mother, and
informed his superior he was involved in a child molestation investiga-
tion.'" The court said these factors demonstrated that his primary
concern was a criminal investigation.'45
The court thus concluded that Officer Lytle's actions could not fit into
an administrative search exception, and therefore he had to either obtain
a warrant or fall within the exigent circumstances exception.'" The
court held that no exigent circumstances were present because the child
was not in immediate danger, and no reasonable officer in those
circumstances would have thought the search was legal. 47 Although the
court did not develop a clear exception to the warrant requirement for
social workers, the court determined that a social worker should be
entitled to qualified immunity in this type of search.'"
The Franz court's focus on the distinction between police officers and
social workers shows that it did not consider the extension to the
administrative search exception described in New York v. Burger.49 The
Burger decision specifically stated that an "administrative scheme may
have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws,"'" and the Court
"fail[ed] to see any constitutional significance in the fact that police
officers, rather than 'administrative' agents, are permitted to conduct the
... inspection."'' In Burger, the junkyard owner unsuccessfully argued
that a police officer's role was to enforce penal laws, not inspect for
regulatory violations, and that therefore a warrant based upon full
141 Id. at 786.
lZId. at 791.






" Id. at 792.
141 Id. at 790. Qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity would be granted
because the Darryl H. case did not clearly answer whether a warrantless search by a
social worker in accordance with a statutory scheme fit within the administrative search
exception. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 908 (7th Cir. 1986).
482 U.S. 691 (1987); see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
"'Bwger, 482 U.S. at 713.
"' Id. at 717.
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probable cause was required." Likewise, the Franz court should have
recognized that an administrative scheme does not violate the Fourth
Amendment solely because "the inspecting officer has the power to arrest
individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme
itself."'5 Officer Lytle in the Franz case argued that he was looking
out for the best interests of the child and was following a legislative
scheme requiring him to do so5 " Not unlike the officer in Burger,
Officer Lytle was conducting a search pursuant to an administrative
scheme and had the power to arrest at the same time.55
Burger can be distinguished from Franz, though, because Burger
involved "closely regulated" industries with reduced privacy expecta-
tions,"s while Franz involved an invasion into a home followed by a
strip-search. 57 This Note does not stand for the proposition that police
officers should be permitted to enter a house and strip-search a child as
easily as they can search a junkyard. However, if the courts do not draw
a distinction between police officers and administrative agents in the
warrantless searches of junkyards, then the same should be true for
searches during child abuse investigations. It is difficult to see how a
social worker/police officer distinction is necessary when an administra-
tive agent/police officer distinction is not."
IV. THE NEED FOR. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
Because the law regarding warrantless searches in child abuse
investigations is unclear, qualified immunity is a viable defense for
investigators.5 9 Individuals may be given qualified immunity, which
152 Id.
15 Id.
154 Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 786-87 (10th Cir. 1993).
1 Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1992), affd, 997 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1993).
154Burger, 482 U.S. at 700.
Franz, 997 F.2d at 785.
" See State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Wis. 1983) (finding a social worker
was a government official and therefore subject to the same Fourth Amendment
requirements as a police officer); see also syqpra notes 68-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Boggess court's treatment of the social worker/police officer distinction).
1" See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 908 (7th Cir. 1986) (granting motion
for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity of the social worker and the
school official); Landstrom v. illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 699 F. Supp.
1270, 1275 (N.D. M11. 1988) (granting qualified immunity to school district employees
involved in the search of a suspected child abuse victim), aft'd, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.
1990); Donald M. v. Matava, 668 F. Supp. 703, 706-07, 713 (D. Mass. 1987) (granting
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allows them to escape liability, in cases where a court later determines a
violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.'" "Violation of a
clearly established right requires ex ante knowledge that such conduct is
prohibited .... 161
In Landstrom v. illinois Department of Children & Family Servic-
es," four school district employees restrained students and then
physically examined and interrogated them because school officials
suspected the children were victims of child abuse." The court found
that the employees were immune from liability in the lawsuit which
alleged violations of the girls' Fourth Amendment rights." A clear
ruling on the application of the Fourth Amendment in these circumstances
would have prevented these defendants from escaping liability without a
determination of the case on its merits. Then, the only way the school
officials could have escaped liability would have been if the court, after
analyzing their actions under the Fourth Amendment, had determined that
their conduct was reasonable. However, because the law on this subject
was unclear, the court granted the school officials qualified immunity and
dismissed the complaint. 65 Other similar cases have been resolved,
before a hearing on the merits, by motions for summary judgment."
Clearly established law also would help prevent an increase in
"overzealous investigations."'" A family in Westchester County, New
York, found themselves the target of a child abuse investigation after a
social worker confused their name with that of another family in another
town.' As part of her investigation, the social worker pulled the children
out of class at school, visually inspected them in a state of partial undress in
front of others, and caused the children to believe they would not see their
parents again.'" The judge expressed some concern over whether the
conduct of the social worker violated the Fourth Amendment. 70 However,
qualified, but not absolute, immunity to social workes).
i Landstrom, 699 F. Supp. at 1275.
1 Id.
tId.
" Id. at 1273.
'R Id. at 1275.
165 Id.
6 See, e.g., Danyl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 908 (7th Cir. 1986); Donald M. v.
Matava, 668 F. Supp. 703, 706-07, 713 (D. Mass. 1987).
16 Glaberson, supra note 2, at Bi.
'a Id.
16 Id.
'7 Id. at B1, B12.
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the parties settled the case prior to trial," leaving these concerns unad-
dressed.
According to a former director of the National Center on Child Abuse,
situations like the one above occur because many inadequately trained social
workers are af-aid of misdiagnosing an actual abusive environment and
therefore tend to be overly aggressive in their investigations. 2 Consequent-
ly, clear guidelines in this area would prevent overly aggressive inspections
from being protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
A U.S. Supreme Court decision on this issue need not dramatically
change the current warrant requirements. The Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement and its recognized exceptions serve the needs of child abuse
investigations. In cases where investigators believe a child is in need of
immediate medical attention or is likely to suffer serious injury, they can
forgo the wan-ant because the emergency rule exception applies. 73 In cases
where investigators suspect parents are abusing their child, police and social
workers should be able to rely on reasonable administrative standards to
conduct a search within the administrative search exception. The administra-
tive standards need to reflect the state' interest in protecting children and
courts seem to recognize that interest already." States may vary as to
degree of protection they are willing to provide families. Courts will have to
define how much of an infringement on a child's or family's privacy interest
the Constitution will permit. But this would amount to a clarification of an
existing exception, not the creation of a new one. 5
CONCLUSION
The need for clearly established law in the area of searches during
child abuse investigations is great. Because of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement carved out in cases like New Jersey v. TL.O.,"
New York v. Burger,1" Griffin v. Wisconsin' and the exigent cir-
17 William Glaberson, Westchester Pledges NewRules in Child-Abuse Inquiries, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A31.
172 Glaberson, siqra note 2, at B12.
' See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 70-115 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 70-115 and accompanying text.
176 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (allowing administrators and teachers to search students without a
warrant where reasonable suspicion exists); see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
1- 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a warantless search ofajunkyardbecause the state had
an administrative scheme in place); see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
1- 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (affirmning an administrative scheme which allowed a warrantless
search of a probationer's home); see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text
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cumstances cases, the groundwork exists for a clear statement of their
applicability to child abuse investigations. Once the courts clearly
establish the law, then defendant government officials cannot utilize
qualified immunity to escape liability.'79 Lack of the qualified immunity
defense will cause investigators to be aware of the rights of children and
their families and help prevent infringement of those rights. Avoiding the
qualified immunity defense also will mean that courts will be able to
decide these types of Fourth Amendment cases on the merits and further
develop the contours of the law; summary judgments based on qualified
immunity do little to develop Fourth Amendment law.
A clear statement of the law, moreover, needs to treat police officers
and social workers equally. No reason exists to assume a police officer
is better versed in Fourth Amendment law regarding child abuse cases
than a social worker. Social workers deal with child abuse investigations
on a day-to-day basis, while a police officer may not see these cases as
regularly. Moreover, any distinction need not be made on the basis that
police seek evidence of a crime while social workers seek to stabilize the
family;, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that administrative
schemes can have the same goals as penal codes and still allow these
warrantless searches within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.180
There is no reason the Supreme Court's ruling should not also apply to
child abuse cases.
Lastly, the Court has clearly stated the law regarding warrantless
searches of junkyards, purses, and buildings for building code violations.
Surely society has enough at stake in its children to compel a clear ruling
in child abuse investigations and thus prevent government officials from
escaping liability through the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Patrick E. O'Neill
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (granting qualified immunity to
public officials when the law is not clearly established).
"o See Bwger, 482 U.S. at 713; see supra notes 86-91; see also supra notes 70-115
and accompanying texL
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